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Introduction
In the standard telling, the United States is one of
the world’s most entrepreneurial countries. It has a
high rate of entrepreneurship and a large number of
rapidly growing companies that quickly displace an
older generation of incumbents. Empirical evidence
tends to confirm these general impressions.1
Research usually seeks to explain why the United
States and other countries (such as the United
Kingdom) tend to be more entrepreneurial than
other nations. Typical explanations include the
nature of a country’s institutions (tax code,
bankruptcy law), sources of financing (typically the
availability of venture capital), as well as more
qualitative factors such as cultural precepts about
business failure and attitudes toward risk-taking.
Anglo-American capitalism and the emerging
variants in East Asia often are held to be conducive
to high volumes of firm formation—a presumption
difficult to comparatively quantify.
Abstract
Recent entrepreneurship research has shed new light on how important new companies—firms less than
five years old—are to economic growth, so the next question raised by economists and policymakers might
be: How do we increase the number of firm formations? In a review of research into entrepreneurial
orientation to help find answers, another important question has arisen: Why does the level of firm
formation remain virtually consistent from year to year?
This paper, the second in the Kauffman Foundation Research Series on Firm Formation and Economic
Growth, explores this question and makes the following key points:
• Firm formation in the United States is remarkably constant over time, with the number of
new companies varying little from year to year. This remains true despite sharp changes in
economic conditions and markets, and longer-cycle changes in population and education.
While existing entrepreneurship data may miss some numbers of new firms, this does not
appear to explain the steady level of firm formation across time.
• Such constancy possibly reflects the nature of the United States economy, employment
churn, and demographics. The paper discusses each in detail, as well as entrepreneurial
motivations, talent, and the so-called “opportunity recognition” model.
• A steady level of firm formation implies that relatively few factors, such as entrepreneurship
education and venture capital, influence the pace of startups, although these factors may
help prevent a decline of new firms and may affect specific companies at the margins. 
• A closer look at the relatively unchanging number of new firms each year offers potential
lessons for public policy, especially when considering the future of entrepreneurship after the
Great Recession of 2007–2009.
This paper examines the implications of each of these points, such as possible reasons why firm formation
is constant and what it means for the wider economy, why efforts to increase entrepreneurship have not had
much effect on the level of firm formation, whether or not the volume of startups really matters to the
economy, and how the recession has impacted firm formation.
Further discussion of some of these questions will be reserved for future papers, but we can at least begin
to explore them here.
1.  See, e.g., World Bank, Entrepreneurship Survey, 2008, at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTFINRES/0,,
contentMDK:21454009~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:478060,00.html; Legatum Insitute, “The 2009 Legatum Prosperity Index,” at
http://www.prosperity.com/; Niels Bosma, et. al, “Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 2008 Executive Report,” at http://www.idisc.net/en/Article.38839.html; Nicolas
Véron, “The Demographics of Global Corporate Champions,” Bruegel Working Paper, July 2008, at http://www.bruegel.org/nc/publications/show/publication/the-
demographics-of-global-corporate-champions.html.
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It appears, in fact, that the annual number of new
companies founded in the United States changes
relatively little from year to year: we have a
surprisingly steady supply of new firms, despite
frequent and sometimes sharp changes in economic
conditions and markets, and longer-cycle changes in
population and education. This raises interesting
questions around entrepreneurship and economic
growth. We would like to know, for example, the
relationship between a constant number of new
firms and the rate of job creation from those new
companies. Following is an overview of data related
to firm formation trends and the questions and
implications that arise.
The Numbers
Should we expect entrepreneurial activity in the
economy to be steady, or should we expect it to be
highly variable? A casual observer with no a priori
knowledge of entrepreneurship, when asked to
estimate annual fluctuations in firm formation,
would be entirely justified in predicting large and
potentially volatile swings from year to year. It is only
reasonable to expect that the array of exogenous
factors theoretically affecting entrepreneurship
would lead to this result. Recessions, expansions, tax
changes, scarce or abundant capital, technological
advances—each of these (and more) bears on the
number of people who each year decide to form
new companies. There are good reasons to expect
that during a recession, for example, the appetite
for risk diminishes and credit is less available, leading
to a steep decline in the number of new companies.
High unemployment also would reduce the incentive
for people to leave their existing positions. Of
course, one also might expect that rising
unemployment would boost firm formation as the
pool of potential entrepreneurs expands. 
Either way, economic cycles should conceivably
lead to material variations in the annual number of
startups. Likewise, the pace of technological change
could be even more determinative; technological
change is always uneven, with some evidence
suggesting that economies experience periodic
technological explosions leading to corresponding
explosions in entrepreneurship.2 Once technological
novelty has run its course and enters a period of
maturation and incremental advance, the level of
entrepreneurship would slow, to that way of
thinking. 
Figure 1 reinforces the inherent variability that
intuition suggests. It shows recent U.S. trends in the
interest in starting a business based on related
Google searches. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009







Figure 1. Source: Authors’ chart created from Google Insights using searches “starting a business,” “how to start a business,” and “start a 
business.” Created December 2009.
2.  See, e.g., Carlota Perez, Technical Revolutions and Financial Bubbles: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages (2003). 
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As the figure shows, there is constant change,
both in the short- and long-run, in the level of
interest in starting new businesses in the United
States.3 That is as might be expected, and yet
neither variation seems to show up in the actual
company creation data.
A near-constant flow of new firms would seem to
contradict claims that the reason entrepreneurship
was long excluded from mainstream economic
theory was its unpredictability. Entrepreneurship, for
example, “is a function that fails to satisfy the
conditions required to define a factor of
production.”4 As a result, entrepreneurs were
thrown into a “residual” category along with
innovation and technology—elements too
discontinuous to reliably assume to be constant. And
why wouldn’t such a phenomenon vary? A
substantial share of new firms fail within their first
two years of existence, and starting a new company
is an uncertain gambit. Consistency is not the first
thing that comes to mind when discussing
entrepreneurship.
But the level of firm formation does not vary
much from year to year. This conclusion arises from
an examination of several firm formation indicators: 
• New establishments (which includes not only
unique firms but also new locations established by
existing firms, such as Walmart or McDonald’s) as
tracked by both the Census Bureau and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); 
• Employer firms as tracked by Census and the
Small Business Administration (SBA); 
• Firm births in a dataset tabulated by the Census
Bureau using OECD methodology; and, 
• Startups (in data collection parlance, “age zero”
firms). 
No matter which dataset one examines, any given
year’s total of new companies is consistent with
other years, with annual numbers fluctuating only
mildly. 
Figures 2 and 3 are taken from the Business












Figure 2. Includes new firms and new locations of existing firms (establishments). Source: Business Dynamic Statistics at 
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_overview




























































3.  In a subsequent paper, we will deal with long-run changes in firm formation.
4.  Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 441 (5th ed., 1996).
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Figure 3: Annual Number of Startups
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Census Bureau. They display the annual number of
new businesses (unique companies and new
locations; Figure 2) and startups (Figure 3) in the
United States from 1977 to 2005. The bars rise and
fall over time, but with only small changes in
number. A cursory glance at these might suggest, as
unlikely as it sounds, some sort of law of mean
reversion with respect to entrepreneurship. It is
unclear why the number of new firms should remain
so consistent. Most remarkably, the quarterly
measure of new businesses (Figure 4) is similar to
the annual totals. The number of people starting
new companies is stable even within a single year.
The Appendix contains frequency distributions for
the foregoing charts, as well as aggregate firm
creation measures from two other sources. As can
be seen, the frequency distributions for new firms
tend to fall into a normal curve, which is interesting
but only reinforces the puzzle of consistency. (A
normal distribution, of course, can even arise from
data that vary considerably and mask changes in
variation over time, as Appendix charts A-11 and A-
12 illustrate.) In any case, the annual variance in the
above charts is mild, with annual totals changing
only three to six percent each year. Given the
number of factors that influence it, and given the
patterns in interest in starting a new company 




One possibility is that this is a function of the data
at hand. We can break this explanation down into
four arguments: first, the data could be wrong;
second, the data could be incomplete; third, the
time series could be too small to draw any
conclusions; and, fourth, the invariance in level may
not matter. Additionally, perhaps it is the case that
this sort of consistency is precisely what we should
expect. 
The first argument relating to data—that firm
formation measurements are erroneous—is readily
addressed. The largest dataset we have, the BDS
series from the Census Bureau, begins in 1977; the
SBA and BLS both date to the early 1990s. If the
constancy of firm formation is to be explained by
measurement error, then that is an incredibly
persistent measurement error, perhaps more
impressive than the dataset itself. Two other
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Figure 4 : Annual Number of Startups
Kauffman Foundation
Figure 4. Quarterly Establishment Births, 1993 Q2 to 2009 Q1. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Business Employment Dynamics: Fourth Quarter 
2008,” August 19, 2009, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cewbd.pdf; Akbar Sadeghi, The Births and Deaths of Business Establishments in the 

































































































































datasets, incidentally, the Kauffman Index of
Entrepreneurial Activity and the Panel Study of
Entrepreneurial Dynamics, also show similar levels of
consistency.5
The second argument is more tractable: It is
conceivable that the new-firm count in any year, and
potentially all years, misses a large portion of
entrepreneurship. Numerous people start companies,
in the sense that they pursue business ventures,
without actually registering a company. The data we
have count incorporated firms and thus would not
capture this population. Similarly, some
entrepreneurs start a new venture “embedded”
within their existing companies—they, too, are not
included in the firm formation data. If we accept
these possibilities, then perhaps the inclusion of
these missing entrepreneurs would, in fact, show
larger annual fluctuations in new companies started.
This is plausible, yet incomplete. It would only
explain why the number of new companies in any
year isn’t larger—that is, a sizeable population of
“missing” entrepreneurs establishes a floor, the
invariance of which would still need to be
explained.6
It may also be the case that there is a much larger
population of so-called nascent entrepreneurs that
never reaches the stage of actual firm formation—
perhaps we don’t see the large fluctuations in the
population of nascent entrepreneurs, only those
who make it to incorporation. This makes sense, but
opens up a deeper mystery: Why is the number of
people who make it from idea to firm founding so
consistent? We could be touching on the role of
transaction costs and barriers to entry, which clearly
play a role in startups. We might hypothesize that a
certain number of people will always make it past
such barriers for whatever reason—financing,
personal circumstances, acumen, business
environment, luck—and that, were entry costs
lowered, we would see larger numbers of
entrepreneurs.7
In this vein, we might consider the nonemployer-
to-employer transition, whereby a number of
5.  See Robert W. Fairlie, “Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity, 1996–2008,” April 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/kiea_042709.pdf; Paul D.
Reynolds and Richard T. Curtin, Business Creation in the United States: Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II Initial Assessment, 4 FOUNDATIONS AND
TRENDS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 155 (2008). 
6.  Further, this argument requires two steps for explanation: the undercount itself, and having those not counted then explain any large fluctuations in the data
(above the floor established by the undercount). Of course, an over-count also is possible, but relying on this possibility still leaves us with multiple steps
unexplained.
7.  This would still leave us arguing above a certain minimum number of new companies, rather than seeing small-to-big annual changes.
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“nonemployer” firms (home-based businesses,
secondary incomes, and very early-stage proto-
companies) become employer firms, hiring
employees in addition to the founder. The universe
of these firms is much larger than that of employer
firms, and prior research has confirmed that, in any
given year, roughly 3 percent of nonemployers make
the transition, amounting to several thousand
“new” companies. In some industries, this transition
represents one-third of new employer firms each
year.8 The large population of nonemployer firms
apparently serves as a constant pipeline of new
employer companies, those typically tracked in
entrepreneurship data. We also may be seeing an
effect explained wholly by industry: Many of the
nonemployer-to-employer firms in this research are
law offices, real estate agents, accountants, and day
cares. These areas don’t seem to have diminished
much in terms of demand (until recently, in the case
of real estate), and so part of this effect might just
be a constant number of such transitions.9 But,
again, why would there be a steady number of
companies ready to make this transition? Is this just
a matter of probability—that in any given year some
nonemployer firms, of varying ages, will be
successful enough to become employer firms—or
are we simply pushing our question back one step
further?10
A third argument relating to data collection—that
the time series is too short—is also plausible. Even
the longest series, covering 1977 to 2005, is
potentially too small to generate any hard
conclusions about the annual variation in new
companies. Firm formation may have fluctuated
much more wildly in previous years, and may do so
again in the future. This would still leave much to be
explained—why did the era under study exhibit such
low variability?11—but we can at least accept it as a
possibility. When we look back at what data do exist
from prior eras, however, this argument does not
hold up.
In its statistical abstracts, the Census Bureau
periodically includes numbers it collected on the
number of new business incorporations each year.
The series is sporadic and not always reliable, but we
might expect that the available data would at least
be consistent for some clusters of years, even if not
entirely comparable to data collected several
decades later. So, for example, using the Census
Statistical Abstracts from 1951 and 1960, we can
look at new business formation for the latter half of
the 1940s and most of the 1950s (Figure 5).12
Contrary to the possibility that prior periods saw
larger annual fluctuations, the 1940s and 1950s also
experienced a remarkably constant number of new
firms formed each year, with annual change only
around 7 percent.
There is, in fact, only one outlier in this data
series—1946, which stands out for its remarkable
distance from any other year in terms of new
companies. Considering that this likely was boosted
by returning veterans and the transition of the U.S.
economy from wartime to private-sector production,
we would fully expect a large number of new
companies. This adds to our puzzle: Why aren’t
there more outlying fluctuations like 1946 due to
exogenous factors? Is firm formation that insensitive
to exogenous shocks, or are true exogenous shocks
that uncommon?
Another set of Census data on new businesses
prompts a fourth argument regarding measurement
issues. Perhaps we have entered a period of
permanently high firm formation, in which the
number of new company starts each year remains
above a certain level and only fluctuates in tiny
increments. In this argument, the consistent level of
new company formation is not a puzzle to be
explained—instead, it is the signal of this new era.
According to the historical Census data, the number
of annual new business incorporations rose sharply
in the late 1970s over the preceding decade and
remained high for the next fifteen years or so.
8.  See Steven J. Davis, et. al, “Measuring the Dynamics of Young and Small Businesses: Integrating the Employer and Nonemployer Universes,” NBER Working Paper
13226, July 2007, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13226. These figures—3 percent and one-third—apply only to the specific industries investigated by these
researchers.
9.  The question of industry composition and entrepreneurship is one we address in a forthcoming paper.
10.  The population of nonemployer firms also has risen rather steadily over the last decade (in terms of net change), which raises the question of why, if a certain
number of nonemployers transition to employer firms every year, this increase didn’t also raise the number of employer firms. Self-employment, by comparison, has
fluctuated mildly and remained mostly flat. There would appear to be a rich vein of research waiting to be tapped regarding the dynamics among employer firms,
nonemployers, and the self-employed. See Small Business Administration, The Small Business Economy 2009, at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_econ2009.pdf. 
11.  In a separate paper, we will address the relationship between the Great Moderation and new firm creation.
12.  See http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab1951—1994.htm.
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Figure 5: Annual Number of New Businesses, 1944–1958
Kauffman Foundation
Figure 5. Number of New Business Incorporations, 1944-1958. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistical Abstracts.
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As can be seen in Table 1, in the individual ten years included in the
dataset from 1960 to 1978, new business incorporations averaged
323,000 per year. From 1979 to 1994, they doubled, averaging
640,000. It is entirely possible that the U.S. economy did indeed enter
a new era of entrepreneurial activity, not only increasing in volume but
also maintaining that volume over a certain threshold. There are good
reasons to accept this story and, indeed, several changes did occur in
the late 1970s that seem to have led to higher rates of firm formation,
including the advent of the personal computer revolution and the rapid
increase in venture capital investments.13 These would accord with our
expectation that exogenous factors like technology and financing might
lead to more variability—but in this case, they sparked an increase and
a constancy of number atop that increase. 
Even if we accept the reasons for higher rates of entrepreneurship,
we’re still left with explaining why those rates were maintained at such
a consistent level. In fact, the annual variance from 1979 to 1994 was
actually lower than the (admittedly shorter) previous period: higher
levels of firm formation in a tighter distribution.14 (This argument for an
era of permanently higher entrepreneurship says nothing of the rate of































Table 1: New Business
Incorporations
Sources: 1980 Census; 1994 Census; 1995
Statistical Abstract; 2000 Statistical Abstract.
13.  See, e.g., William Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism,
and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity (2007); Carl J. Schramm, The Entrepreneurial Imperative
(2006). This requires explaining two phenomena: the step-change increase in the late 1970s and then
the constancy at that new, higher level. This looks very much like a punctuated equilibrium-type
structure and could be related to the nature of the 1970s (volatile) compared to the prior and
subsequent periods. See, e.g., Steven J. Davis and James A. Kahn, Interpreting the Great Moderation:
Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
2008, at 155.
14.  We may also be dealing with a law of large numbers effect. Smaller numbers of firm starts, in a
smaller economy, for example, could show wider variability. It would be interesting to compare
company formation across different states and regions to test this; we take up a related argument below.
A second problem with this dataset is that there is reason to doubt these Census data on new business
incorporation. They don’t match up with any of the other datasets we have, including the BDS and SBA
series, which are derived from Census data. It seems reasonable to rely on more recent data collections
for the same time period and, at any rate, we still have our puzzle.
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comparison between Figure 5 and Figure 2 shows
that the absolute number of new businesses
doubled from the 1940s and 1950s to the 1980s
and 1990s. Over that half century, of course, the
American population also doubled, somewhat
undercutting this argument. A newly entrepreneurial
era should lead to more new firms than would be
expected from population growth. We are hesitant,
however, to fully compare these two sets of data as
any methodological differences are not immediately
apparent. In more recent years, Census data have
tracked the entrepreneurship rate and in a
subsequent paper we will examine reasons behind
its downward trend.)
So What Explains It?
To go beyond possible methodological
explanations, let’s turn to entrepreneurship itself:
Why do people start new companies, anyway? In
some cases, it may be a function of opportunity—an
idea that must be commercialized as soon as
possible. For others, it is a matter of necessity—an
individual has few other prospects and needs a way
to earn a living. Other reasons include a preference
for autonomy (a person wants to be his or her own
boss) and the chance for further growth.15 These are
among the traditional lines of demarcation in the
research literature: opportunity, necessity,
preference, and industry dynamics. Yet these do not
quite get to the question of consistency (unless it’s
simply a matter of aggregation).16
If the act of starting a company is simply an
automatous response to an opportunity, then a
steady number of new firms implies a steady set of
opportunities waiting to be recognized and
exploited.17 This is plausible: the United States is a
diverse and dynamic economy with potentially
endless room for innovation and profit-making. This
idea of opportunity recognition, however, suffers
from a number of shortcomings and still requires
explanation of a steady supply of opportunities in
the context of discontinuous innovation.18 Perhaps,
of course, we are envisioning two different
distributions: a steady stream of new firms created
to capitalize on an uneven probability of innovation.
Not all survive and only some succeed (in terms of
growth). Here, opportunity recognition fails because
a firm’s success is idiosyncratic to the firm, not the
opportunity chased by many.
Opportunities bubble up from the desultory and
recombinant process of innovation, a process that
feeds itself: “Entrepreneurship creates an
environment that makes more entrepreneurship
possible.”19 Opportunities emerge from
entrepreneurship, rather than calling, Pavlov-like,
entrepreneurs into existence. Once set in motion,
then, a certain level of entrepreneurship might
conceivably persist (although it’s not clear if the rate
would behave in the same way). Behind this may be
a larger explanation: Economic growth, itself a
function of innovation and entrepreneurship,
expands the scope for more entrepreneurship. The
World Bank’s incipient efforts to measure cross-
country entrepreneurship show a strong relationship
between firm formation and a country’s extant level
of income rather than its growth performance.20 So
the level of entrepreneurship in the United States
since the late 1970s could partly reflect previous
economic performance; as we discuss below and in
a later paper, this makes sense in terms of
technology since the information technology
revolution closely associated with the 1980s and
1990s had its beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s.21
15.  Many spinoffs, for example, open up a greater horizon for revenue and wage growth than if the unit remained within a parent company.
16.  At smaller levels of explanation, it is at least possible that some portion of the constant level of firm formation is accounted for by repeat players—serial
entrepreneurs who often succeed, as well as those who fail, try again, fail, and try again, all in the span of two to four years. Undoubtedly, this phenomenon lurks
somewhere in the data, but it is likely so small as to be unimportant. There is simply no way, for example, that yearly new business formation approaches anything
close to 100 percent turnover. It also is possible, though unquantifiable, that the entrepreneurial propensity in the population is a fixed quantity. There could always
be some unchanging segment of the population prepared to start a business which cannot be increased (or, potentially, decreased) by outside factors. This would be
the conclusion reached by those who explain entrepreneurship by way of genetic determinism. According to this line of inquiry, your genetic makeup determines
your eventual occupation, including the choice to start a new company. It’s not entirely clear how this would explain a falling or flattening rate of firm entry: Are the
entrepreneur genes being selected out? Do entrepreneurs not procreate?
17.  See, e.g., Scott Shane, Prior Knowledge and the Discovery of Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 11 ORG. SCI. 448 (2000).
18.  See Dane Stangler, Creative Discovery: Reconsidering the Relationship Between Entrepreneurship and Innovation, INNOVATIONS, Spring 2009, at 119.
19.  Randall G. Holcombe, Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth, Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON., Summer 1998, at 45, 51.
20.  See, e.g., Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, Mauro F. Guillen, “Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation Across Countries,” World Bank, February 2008, at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/475459-1222364030476/FirmFormation_NBER.pdf.
21.  We could avoid the teleological implications here (that a “developed” country has reached any sort of end-state) by instead conceiving of innovation,
entrepreneurship, and growth in a marginal returns/punctuated equilibrium-type model, though without fixed cycles that sometimes appear in the evolutionary
economics literature.
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Where, though, do these entrepreneurs come
from? It’s tempting to think about this in allocative
terms. We usually think of entrepreneurship as a
meta-category, somehow different from traditional
classifications of talent like the share of workers in
science and engineering.22 Perhaps there is such a
thing as “entrepreneurial talent,” the allocation of
which is more or less fixed.23 Alternatively, perhaps
the dynamics of the economy itself endogenously
generate a supply of potential entrepreneurs. The
United States experiences a fair amount of churn in
the labor market: hirings, firings, people voluntarily
leaving for another employer.24 If the level of
employment churn is more or less constant, then
there might be a more or less steady supply of
potential entrepreneurs, whatever their motivation
or talent allocation.
This would push us to explain, first, why the level
of employment turnover is so steady and, second,
why some constant number of people out of this
churn choose to form new companies. It also would
be interesting, then, if overall job creation in the
United States was steady—does the outcome (job
creation) reflect the process (job churn)? 
22.  The National Science Foundation’s Science and Engineering Indicators report breaks down every four-digit NAICS industry classification by what percentage of
employees can be classified as “science and engineering” workforce. See http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/, Appendix Table 3-4. 
23.  See also William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, Destructive 98 J. POL. ECON. 893 (Oct. 1990). We are not prepared to endorse any
presuppositions based on a supposedly genetic propensity toward entrepreneurship or other careers.
24.  On a quarterly basis, in fact, 4 percent of the labor force moves from one employer to another, a mostly steady level of churn. See, e.g., Melissa Bjelland, et. al,











Figure 6. Source: Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).



































































































































Figure 9. An “exit” simply means that the firm or location no longer shows up in the dataset, so it includes not only company failure but also merger 
and acquisition. Source: BDS.
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If we drill down further into the tumultuous world
of firms starting, firms closing, and the employment
consequences, an interesting picture emerges. For
one thing, the various measures we have of adverse
firm outcomes—exits, deaths, bankruptcies—are
more variable than measures of new-firm creation.
(See Appendix for additional charts.).
Closings and the associated churn are not as
uniform as firm creation is. The charts cover a
different population of companies—in any year’s
population of bankrupt or closing firms, we will find
firms of varying ages and sizes. Firm closure,
moreover, would seem to be more correlated with
exogenous factors; the death rate of companies in
the overall economy rises during recessions, even
though recessions don’t have a noticeable impact on
firm formation.
The fact that firm exit varies across time (and
dataset) may help explain the constancy of firm
formation. If the eventual prospects facing new
companies were totally invariant (across the entire
lifecycle, not just in the first few years), new-firm
creation might be suppressed. Variability of
outcomes across time, industry, size, and age is a
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perpetual source of hope to anyone who considers
founding a company. A uniform set of exit indicators
wouldn’t be expected to encourage people to start
anew. We might also be seeing the reverse scenario,
in which a constant number of new firms causes
different outcomes throughout the population of
companies. Incumbent firms are continually
challenged by new entrants, with the result that
sometimes the incumbent survives (or declines and
disappears) while the challenger closes (or survives
and grows). Reality is probably somewhere in the
middle, with these two effects interacting with each
other.
Another way to look at the supply of new firms is
through the lens of marginal costs and marginal
benefits weighed by prospective entrepreneurs.
There is some evidence in the research literature that
barriers to entry—which affect the marginal cost of
starting a company—more strongly influence the
entrepreneurial decision of people with lower levels
of human capital (i.e., “necessity” entrepreneurs).
Those with more human capital, alternately, weigh
their decision in terms of the marginal benefits of
starting a new firm since, presumably, this
population can more easily raise resources (thus
overcoming a big barrier to entry), and also can find
well-paying wage work in an existing company. The
barriers here, then, relate to subsequent company
growth, not the initial startup decision.25 Thus, in
any given year the number of new firms is
determined by people weighing marginal costs (Can
I afford to enter?) and marginal benefits (What is
the opportunity cost of the potential payoff?) or, at
least, what these are perceived to be.26
But, for this dichotomy to explain a consistent
annual level of entrepreneurship, the marginal costs
and benefits would have to be mostly immutable
over this thirty-year timeframe. This is at least
plausible—the composition of any year’s crop of
new firms will be determined by the differential
dynamics across sectors of the economy as well as
the macroeconomic climate. From the early 1980s
until quite recently, the United States experienced
falling employment volatility and falling volatility
among firms.27 These, coupled with a long
expansion interrupted by two mild recessions, could
have meant that the marginal benefits for potential
high-growth entrepreneurs fell relative to rising
wages and job security at existing companies. Of
course, if that were the case, it would mean more
“necessity” entrepreneurs (because the number
remained constant), which could be skewed toward
lower-skilled workers. Given the widening income
distribution and corresponding effects of
globalization on low-skill industries, this is possible,
but merits a larger discussion in a separate paper.28 It
also may be that it was the “marginal benefit
entrepreneurs” who rose as a share of the new-firm
population. The high rates of firm creation in areas
such as professional services as well as other effects
of globalization make this plausible.29
These considerations raise two final factors,
namely, demographics and economic system. Above,
we raised the possibility that the period from the
late 1970s to the early twenty-first century could be
unique in both the level and pace of firm formation,
perhaps reflecting technology or other broad
changes. The steady churn of employment, together
with the constant number of new firms, could be
pointing us toward population composition. A
young and growing population might be expected
to have a different entrepreneurial flavor than an
aging population does. If this is true, it might mean
that the constant level of the last two decades is an
anomaly and might change accordingly with
demographics. 
In Figure 10 we see that, in the time period at
issue here (marked by the dotted lines), the working
age population in the United States was a rather
steady share of overall population compared to
1950–1975 and what is projected to come in the
next few decades.30
25. See, e.g., Charles E. Eesley, “Who Has the ‘Right Stuff’? Human Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Institutional Change in China,” Paper Presented at the World Bank
Conference on Entrepreneurship and Growth, November 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/Eesley_Right_Stuff_8-05-09.pdf. 
26.  As we discuss in later papers, falling marginal returns anticipated by potential entrepreneurs may help explain a falling rate of entrepreneurship.
27.  See Steven J. Davis, et. al, “Business Volatility, Job Destruction, and Unemployment,” NBER Working paper 14300, September 2008, at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14300.pdf; Steven J. Davis and James A. Kahn, Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the
Macro and Micro Levels, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2008, at 155.
28.  For a good survey of the different effects of globalization, see Dennis J. Snower, et. al, Globalization and the Welfare State: A Review of Hans-Werner Sinn’s Can
Germany Be Saved?, J. ECON. LIT, March 2009, at 136.
29.  See, e.g., Paul Kedrosky and Dane Stangler, “What is a Startup?”, Kauffman Foundation, forthcoming.
30.  We will discuss demographics in more detail in a subsequent paper.
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Figure 10. Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, at http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
Figure 10: Working Age Population (15–64) as Share of Total Population, United States
Kauffman Foundation








Lastly, the steadiness of new-firm creation in the
United States could reflect the nature of our
economic system: Stability breeds stability, even in
an area as messy as entrepreneurship. This doesn’t
mean, of course, that the process of starting a new
company is predictable or smooth—only that, in the
aggregate, the stability of the U.S. economy may
mean we will always have thousands of people
embarking on their own business ventures. (There is
some circularity here, in that past economic
performance often shapes future economic
performance.) Less developed or developing
countries may have much more variable levels of
firm formation.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has been compiling
entrepreneurship indicators across countries, and has
published data for a handful of years.31 Countries
such as Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, and
Latvia have had high rates of new-firm creation as
well as (with the exception of Romania) high
proportions of high-growth companies. Checking
World Bank data indicates that these countries have
experienced very large increases in the number of
new companies started each year this decade. More
unstable (and, perhaps, less developed) economies,
then, could experience larger swings in company
creation.32
In seeking to explain the relatively constant level
of firm formation in the United States, we have seen
that it could be related to the composition of the
population of entrepreneurs, the steady rate of
employment churn, and demographic and
macroeconomic stability. The real question is what
all of this means.
Possible Implications
The fact that firm formation is remarkably
invariant over time is interesting as far as it goes,
but why should we care? And, if it really is this
consistent, doesn’t it make policymaking and
economic research easier? 
Should we really expect firm formation to change
that much? We’ve seen that the U.S. working-age
population has been steady over the relevant time
frame, possibly helping to explain this phenomenon.
The period from the mid-1980s to roughly 2007 also
was characterized by unusual macroeconomic
stability—the Great Moderation—and an explosion
in available credit that likely made it easier to start a
new company.33 Stability, prosperity, and easy money,
in other words, acted as the safety net for firm
formation. And yet, even if the consistent number of
new firms can be satisfactorily explained, the
31.  See OECD, Measuring Entrepreneurship: A Digest of Indicators (2008), and Timely Entrepreneurship Indicators (2009), at
http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/oecd-report-on-entrepreneurship-reveals-clear-glimpses-of-economic-impact-on-2009-firm-starts-and-exits.aspx. 
32.  It’s important to add a qualification here: without adequate data in the coming years, this possibility, at least in comparative terms, will remain a very tentative
proposition. It is possible that the very stability of the United States economy helps explain the puzzle proposed here, without any recourse to cross-country
comparisons. 
33.  Of course, over this period of time we’ve also seen a declining rate of entrepreneurship, a phenomenon we will explore in a forthcoming paper.
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implications are potentially troubling—not least of
which is the conventional view that the United
States entered a super-charged entrepreneurial
period in the 1990s, culminating in the dotcom
bubble and bust. The steadiness of new-firm
creation calls into question not only this type of
popular perception but also the underlying
connections between new firms and economic
performance typically taken for granted.
We probably can’t tell, in any case, whether the
annual number of new firms, while constant, is too
high or too low. Does it mean the U.S. economy is
underperforming? Overperforming? The fact that
the United States ranks highly against other
countries in terms of entrepreneurship is only
marginally informative as it tells us little about what
entrepreneurship contributes to different economies.
Other developed nations have low rates of
entrepreneurship and there is little evident
relationship between growth rates and firm entry
rates.34 This in no way means entrepreneurship is
irrelevant to economic growth, but it means we
can’t take apart that relationship using only the
quantitative measures at hand. And, it doesn’t allow
us to say whether the level of new-firm formation is
too high or too low. If entrepreneurship drives
growth through a recombinant process of
innovation and discovery and challenge, situated
within a time and technology-specific context, 
it’s difficult to capture the phenomenon through
aggregate measures like firm formation.35 New 
firms matter, of course, but it is not so simple 
or mechanistic.
So far, our discussion has mostly focused on an
affirmative question: Why is the annual number of
new firms relatively constant? But the obverse
question also matters: Why doesn’t the level of
entrepreneurship vary more? The period under
study, the late 1970s to early 2000s, experienced a
veritable explosion in efforts to promote and
increase new-firm formation. The consistency
discussed here suggests low sensitivity to short- and
medium-term trends. 
Take two indicators: entrepreneurship education
and venture capital. Once the United States
ostensibly entered an era of heightened
entrepreneurship, colleges and universities rushed to
establish courses and degrees in entrepreneurship.
By one estimate, slightly more than 200 institutions
offered entrepreneurship courses in the late 1970s, a
number that ballooned to more than 2,000 in
2005.36 Yet, this had no appreciable impact on
34.  As mentioned, a much stronger relationship exists between the existing level of a country’s income and its rate of entrepreneurship; that is, already-developed
countries have high rates of entrepreneurship. 
35.  See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Recombinant Growth, 113 Q.J. ECON. 331 (1998). 
36.  See “Entrepreneurship in American Higher Education,” A Report from the Kauffman Panel on Entrepreneurship Curriculum in Higher Education, Kauffman
Foundation, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/entrep_high_ed_report.pdf. 
Figure 11. Sources: Business Dynamics Statistics; Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Money of Invention: How Venture 
Capital Creates New Wealth (2001).
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Figure 12. Sources: Business Dynamics Statistics; Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Money of Invention: How Venture 
Capital Creates New Wealth (2001); PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree Report, at 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp.
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entrepreneurial activity in the United States.37
Likewise, venture capital often is taken to be a proxy
for entrepreneurship.38 In 1978, new venture capital
funds raised $424 million; this rose to $4 billion in
1986, and exploded in the late 1990s to more than
$10 billion in 1996, $20 billion two years later, and
$100 billion in 2000.39 And yet, in the period during
which venture capital grew so rapidly and
increasingly captured the public mind as a synonym
for entrepreneurship, levels of firm formation barely
moved. The rate, in fact, was flat.40
After 2000, as venture capital investments fell in
the aftermath of the bursting dotcom bubble, the
number of new companies actually rose slightly. It
could be the case that entrepreneurship education
programs and venture capital do affect firm
formation, but only inconsistently and at the
margins. Would halving venture capital investments
or closing most entrepreneurship education
programs have any noticeable effect on firm
formation? The invariance also is puzzling given
research showing that prior experience in starting a
firm, or knowing an entrepreneur, raise the
likelihood of someone starting a company.41 A
growing pool of new firms, producing more
“entrepreneur wealth,” should have thus caused
subsequent numbers to rise. Evidently not.
We must keep in mind that our perspective here is
limited to a temporal black box: We can only
speculate about new business creation outside the
time periods in our datasets. Either way, it still
appears to be the case that factors aimed specifically
at increasing entrepreneurship bear little relationship
with the reality of firm formation. Turning this
question around, however, it could very well be the
case that things like entrepreneurship education and
venture capital have helped maintain a constant
level of firm formation. As mentioned, the rate at
which new companies are created in the United
States fell over the past two decades and then flat-
lined in more recent years. We will explore the
reasons behind these trends in a separate paper, but
the fact that the rate diverged from the absolute
level indicates that some forces were exerting
37.  In a recent Kauffman Foundation report, John Pryor and E.J. Reedy document college student aspirations over time, 1976 to 2008. They find that the number of
freshmen reporting aspirational interest in becoming business owners or proprietors, while mildly increasing over thirty years and fluctuating a bit, has remained
mostly flat for the past decade or two at around 3 percent to 4 percent. See John H. Pryor and E.J. Reedy, “Trends in Business Interest Among U.S. College Students,”
Kauffman Foundation, November 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/trends-in-business-interest.pdf. 
38. See, e.g., Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed—and What to Do 
about It. (2009).
39.  See Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 145 (2001); PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital
Association MoneyTree Report, at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp. 
40.  See also Paul Kedrosky, “Right-Sizing the U.S. Venture Capital Industry,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/USVentCap061009r1.pdf. 
41. See, e.g., Paul D. Reynolds and Richard T. Curtin, Business Creation in the United States: Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II Initial Assessment, 4
FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 155 (2008).
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downward pressure on entrepreneurship. It’s
conceivable, then, that the explosion of
entrepreneurship education and venture capital
prevented entrepreneurship from declining further.
One way to dig deeper into this is to examine any
difference in the distribution of new-company
creation across industries. Specific industries may not
move as uniformly as the aggregate data.
Unfortunately, our data capacity erodes at this point
as the best dataset we have, the Business Dynamics
Statistics series, only includes an industry breakdown
along nine “super-sectors.”42 Thus, a generic
“Services” category represents the largest area and
includes everything from education and health care
to research and development and administrative
outsourcing. Nevertheless, it could be helpful to see
if any interesting inter-industry differences emerge.
(See also charts in the Appendix.)
Comparing standard deviations of comparable
sectors certainly conveys the impression that
different areas of the economy (at least as
categorized in these super-sectors) move in response
to idiosyncratic factors, a none-too-surprising
observation.
We don’t want to suggest some sort of economic
homeostasis, but it could simply be the case that the
fluctuations across different sectors add up to an
emergent macro-pattern of stable startup activity.43
Beneath the smooth surface, in other words, is a
considerable amount of volatility.
The industry differences raise another factor that
might be at work here: geography. If Americans
move around the country at a more or less constant
pace, some regions will always be gaining
population while others will always be losing








Figure 13. Annual standard deviations for each sector. On average, from 1977 to 2005, services startups accounted for 36 percent of total annual 
startups, compared to 24 percent for retail. These are the two biggest super-sectors in the BDS data. Authors' calculations from BDS.






































































42.  From the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/. The sectors are: Agriculture, Mining, Construction,
Manufacturing, Transportation/Communications/Utilities, Wholesale, Retail, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate, and Services.
43.  According to the theories of Joseph Schumpeter and Israel Kirzner, entrepreneurship fundamentally shapes a homeostatic state of an economy. For Schumpeter,
entrepreneurial firms continuously disequilibrate the economy, disrupting the “circular flow,” meaning our constant supply of new companies kept the U.S. economy
perpetually out of anything resembling equilibrium. For Kirzner, by contrast, entrepreneurs move an economy back into equilibrium by arbitraging profit
opportunities—from this angle, a constant number of new firms has kept the U.S. economy in equilibrium. Has Kirzner been vindicated? See Joseph A. Schumpeter,
The Theory of Economic Development (1912); Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (1973).
44.  This also will depend on natural population growth (births and deaths) and immigration, but for the purposes of entrepreneurship, we’re interested in internal
migration.
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Since the mid-1980s, the number of Americans
picking up and moving (after fixed residence for one
year) has been more or less steady, at around 41
million per year.45 If a certain city or state (say, Las
Vegas over the past decade) experiences a rapid
population influx from other cities and states, then it
means those other places are not keeping up. Rapid
population growth will often mean a high number
of new and young firms, so we would expect Las
Vegas, or the entire state of Nevada, to have a
relatively elevated rate of entrepreneurship.46 In this
scenario, then, firm formation across the country is
somewhat of a zero-sum game, with internal
migration explaining regional differences while
maintaining a steady number of new companies at
the national level.
These, however, are rather unsatisfying
explanations because they still don’t explain why the
overall number of new companies should be
consistent. Unevenness across regions and sectors
may explain the constant figure itself, but not the
endogenous mechanisms behind it. This further
highlights the apparently general lack of knowledge
in terms of how to increase entrepreneurship. Why
haven’t things like entrepreneurship education,
venture capital, and greater public celebration of




One answer is that this is the wrong question—
that the volume of new firms is irrelevant. Part of
the reason entrepreneurship has only been
tangentially included in mainstream economic
models is that the process of development, with
entrepreneurship as a key mechanism, is quite
difficult to neatly model: “Webs and chains of
historical events are so intricate, so imbued with
random and chaotic elements … that standard
models of simple prediction and replication do not
apply.”47 The process rather than the input is what
matters. After all, the impact of firms is what
45.  The percentage of people moving, however, has been steadily falling. This seems to contradict a persistent American myth that the population is increasingly
restive and on the move.
46.  See John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda, “Entrepreneurship Across States,” Kauffman Foundation, Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing, February
2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/bds_states_020709.pdf.
47.  Stephen Jay Gould, The Evolution of Life on Earth, SCI. AMER., October 1994, at 63.
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matters, and it doesn’t necessarily require a certain
number of companies to make a given impact.
Google was one of dozens of search engines
founded during the dotcom frenzy, but has had
more impact than all the others combined. Did it
matter that all those other companies were
founded? Almost certainly, both in a competitive
sense, as well as by cumulative learning, as Google
could benefit from what its predecessors had done,
whether they succeeded or failed. Yet we have no
way of knowing whether or not there is an
“optimal” number of companies that must be
created for the next Google to blossom.
Some empirical research indicates that the
economic gains made by a relative handful of high-
performing companies account for large shares of
job creation and innovation.48 Most companies in the
U.S. economy are small, and most of those that start
each year will grow only modestly and remain small.
Many will simply fail. Others will be acquired in their
early stages by larger and more mature companies.
Some will enjoy rapid growth, starting at different
ages, creating many jobs and innovations in the
process. Indeed, rough calculations using Census
and OECD data indicate that, of the several
thousand jobs created by “continuing” (existing)
companies each year, around a third come from a
small number of high-growth companies, which
usually comprise less than one percent of the total
population of extant companies. Other estimates,
48. See Dane Stangler and Bob Litan, “Where Will the Jobs Come From?” Kauffman Foundation, November 2009, at
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/where_will_the_jobs_come_from.pdf; Carl Schramm and Dane Stangler, “The Survival and Growth of New Firms,” Kauffman
Foundation, forthcoming.
Figure 15. A hypothetical illustration of the frequency distribution of firms against the potential impact curve of a 
handful of high-performing companies.
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using Census data, suggest that, in any given year,
the top 5 percent of firms (performance in terms of
job growth) account for two-thirds of job creation.
Given the complexity, we might do just as well to
think in terms of Figure 15. We have charted
hypothetical lines about the distribution of impact
among the number of new and continuing firms.
Here, a small portion of companies accounts for the
lion’s share of additive impact. This doesn’t mean
that in any particular year only a small subset of
companies dominates. Most firms in the United
States are small, but a very large share of
employment is in a tiny sliver of bigger companies.
What we’re interested in here is the year-over-year
change in jobs and wages and innovations. And it’s
here that only a small slice of companies accounts
for most of the additional growth each year. The
line, I1, illustrates this. 
If our aim is to increase the quality and
performance of entrepreneurs, and if we conceive of
the breakdown like this, then we can think of our
efforts in terms of moving from line I1 to I2—
expanding the number of companies that have a
large impact (and increasing the impact of lesser-
performing firms down the line) such that the
economy itself expands. Some recent empirical work
has described an “up-or-out” dynamic in the churn
of young firms, meaning that many young firms fail
to survive long, but those that do survive tend to
grow relatively rapidly.49 Here, too, we might see
evidence of the impact of things such as
entrepreneurship education and venture capital—
even if they didn’t appear to influence the
aggregate level of entrepreneurship in the American
economy, they may have played a role in magnifying
the impact of specific companies. Perhaps more
startups became fast-growing, job-creating
companies because of these factors.50 
Another way to consider this point is as a parallel
to the neutralist theory of evolutionary change,
wherein there is a base-level rate of constant (and
relatively rapid) change, much of which is neutral
from the perspective of selection and propagation—
that is, impact. (This is strictly a macroeconomic
perspective since economic evolution includes a
great deal of individual agency.) But, we know from
these data that half of a year’s crop of new
companies will fail within five years.51 We also know
that most firms will have a minimal impact in terms
of jobs and innovations. What we cannot know is
which companies will be “neutral” (that is, they will
fail or have a minimal impact). This neutralist view is
metaphorically imperfect, but it helps make sense of
a situation in which there is a steady rate of new-
firm formation but a much more uneven pace of
innovation and impact.52
Recall that many firms making the switch from
nonemployer to employer firm are law offices, real
estate agents, and accountants. We will see in a
subsequent paper that the composition of new firms
in any given year tends to be marked especially by
sectors such as these, in addition to restaurants and
retail outlets. These sectors can, of course, be
sources of innovative, high-growth firms,53 but this
base-level population of new companies points
toward something like the neutralist perspective.
Volume, then, may matter less than impact.54 This
would help explain the apparent contradiction
between the popular view of the 1990s as an
entrepreneurial era and the real numbers, which
show little change in firm formation—we think of it
as an entrepreneurial boom because of the type of
49.  See John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, Javier Miranda, “High Growth and Failure of Young Firms,” Kauffman Foundation, Business Dynamics Statistic Briefing, March
2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/bds_high_growth_and_failure_4-6-09.pdf.
50.  Such a possibility finds support in recent research pointing to increasing differential trends in volatility among privately-held and publicly-traded companies over
the past thirty years. The universe of public companies, for a variety of reasons, was increasingly composed in the 1980s and 1990s of younger and therefore more
volatile firms. Even as the level of entrepreneurship remained steady—and the rate decreased—there were more entrepreneurial companies (younger, more
innovative) among public corporations, creating jobs and challenging incumbents. See Steven J. Davis et. al, Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates:
Publicly Traded versus Privately Held Firms, in NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2006, VOLUME 21 (2007), available at http://www.nber.org/books/acem06-1. 
51.  See Dane Stangler, “The Economic Future Just Happened,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/the-economic-future-just-
happened.pdf.
52.  In the evolutionary biology context, Stephen Jay Gould described it this way: “The ticking [molecular clock] seems best interpreted as a pervasive and underlying
neutralism, the considerable perturbations as a substantial input from natural selection (and other causes).” Stephen Jay Gould, Betting on Chance—and No Fair
Peeking, in EIGHT LITTLE PIGGIES: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1993). Not to take the analogy too far, but the “considerable perturbations” in the
economic sphere would, naturally, be innovations.
53.  A chain restaurant or chain retail store, by virtue of being a chain, is doing something new that other companies are not doing.
54.  It could be the case that there is no inherent value in the annual number of new companies created each year. Every decision to form a new firm will be shaped
by various factors, not all of which will be universal. From a macroeconomic perspective, the rate of entrepreneurship will be determined by the expected marginal
return, relative to not starting a company. This expectation, moreover, could move in cyclical waves that are much longer than yearly or quarterly factors and deeper
than conventional factors like venture capital. We are thinking principally here of demography and technology, the influence of which will in turn vary.
C o n c l u d i n g  T h o u g h t s
K a f f u m a n  F o u n d a t i o n  Re s e a r c h  S e r i e s : F i r m  F o r m a t i o n  a n d  E c o n o m i c  G r o w t h20
companies that launched themselves into the public
consciousness and onto the NASDAQ stock
exchange. The resurgence of productivity, the boom
in public listings during the 1990s, together with the
explosion in venture capital and the rise of new
technology-based sectors all would seem to indicate
that something was occurring beneath the surface
of steady firm formation.55 If the absolute level of
firm formation doesn’t seem to matter much, and if
it hasn’t changed in response to factors aimed at
increasing it, where do new firms fit into theories
about innovation and economic growth?
Concluding Thoughts
The puzzle of the consistency of firm formation
has many interesting implications, and poses
questions as to the relationship between new (and
existing) firms and innovation. Innovation is an
uneven recombinant process that is not easily
predicted. The intellectual breakthrough made by
Joseph Schumpeter over the neoclassical economic
paradigm was the insight that the essence of
capitalism consists not in movement from one static
resting point to another, but in constant change and
growth. These, in turn, are not driven by exogenous
factors outside the economic system that happen to
buffet it every now and then, but are shaped by
characteristics innate to the economy itself, primarily
the unpredictable processes of innovation and
entrepreneurship.56 What would Schumpeter say
when presented with the reality (at least the reality
of the last thirty years, declared more than once to
be an “Age of Schumpeter”) of a relatively
unchanging number of new firms each year? He
might try to fit it into his theory of the short and
long cyclical waves of innovation, viz., a
revolutionary burst of technological change
unleashed a wave of new companies that lasted
across many years and diffused across all sectors of
the economy. He also might agree that volume
matters little and that only in retrospect will we be
able to perceive those innovative and fast-growing
companies that emerged out of a particular year’s
class of new firms. 
Finally, the explanations offered here for why the
level of firm formation from year to year varies so
little are incomplete. It’s clear that more and better
data will help, but this will be a long time coming—
we will need to keep tabs on how the levels change
henceforth. We have raised a number of questions
in this paper, pertaining to data collection as well as
the interpretation and use of those data. Can we
pinpoint the endogenous, and apparently short-run,
factors driving new company creation? Can we (or
should we) devise policies that will generate more
new companies? More generally, this discussion
highlights the general lack of understanding as
regards entrepreneurship and new-firm formation.
Every year, the phenomena of firm creation and firm
growth reshape the economy, yet we have only the
vaguest idea of how they proceed. These are all
interesting issues worth discussing, as they raise
questions about the nature of the American
economy and its subsequent development. 
It remains to be seen, too, how the severe
recession of 2007–09 will affect new-firm formation
in the United States. Early indicators are mixed, with
some showing a rise in entrepreneurship and others
showing a decline. Nevertheless, it’s clear from the
evidence presented here that entrepreneurship—the
creation of new firms and the jobs and innovations
they bring—is a persistent phenomenon in the
United States economy. At any given time, hundreds
of thousands of Americans are prepared to take a
leap into the unknown and pursue an idea. Policies
will affect this number at the margins, but the most
important thing we can do to promote
entrepreneurship is to provide a hospitable
environment. Entrepreneurs are the bearers of often-
discomfiting change, and we must continue to
ensure that such change is not prospectively
discouraged, but welcomed and celebrated.
55. See, e.g., David Weild and Edward Kim, “A Wake-Up Call for America,” Grant Thornton, Capital Market Series, November 2009.
56. See, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1911); Nathan Rosenberg, Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics, and 
History (1994).

















Figure A-1. Establishment Births, 1977–2005, showing frequency distribution for number of years falling into each 
category. Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, at http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_overview. 
Figure A-2. Author calculations from BDS.
Figure A-1. Frequency Distribution: 
Annual Number of New Establishments, 1977–2005
Figure A-2. Frequency Distribution of Annual Deviations 
from Mean: New Establishments
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Figure A-3. Startups, 1977– 2005. Source: Business Dynamics Statistics, at http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds/bds_overview.
Figure A-4. 1977—2005. Author calculations from BDS.
Figure A-3. Frequency Distribution: 
Annual Number of Startups, 1977–2005
Figure A-4. Frequency Distribution of Annual Deviations 
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Figure A-5. Special Tabulation from the U.S. Census Bureau of the Longitudinal Business Database Following Definitions of 
the OECD Entrepreneurship Indicators Program (hereafter OECD-Census). Clearly, this dataset appears to demonstrate much 
more volatility from year to year than the charts included in the main text. Its relegation to the Appendix, however, is not an 
attempt to bury it. Instead, it reflects the nature of these data. The spikes in firm births here happen to occur in years—1987, 
1992, 1997, 2002—in which the Census Bureau conducts its in-depth Economic Census. We believe, on the basis of 
discussion with other Kauffman Foundation colleagues, that this apparent coincidence calls the comparative accuracy of this 
dataset into question. Note that Figures A-6 and A-7, the frequency distributions for this dataset, fall into a normal curve; 
while hardly conclusive since even volatile datasets can be made to fit normal distributions, this does suggest that this 
dataset is consistent with the others notwithstanding the methodological spikes.
Figure A-6. Special Tabulation from the U.S. Census Bureau of the Longitudinal Business Database Following Definitions of 
the OECD Entrepreneurship Indicators Program (hereafter OECD-Census). 
Figure A-5. Annual Number of Firm Births
Figure A-6. Frequency Distribution of Annual 
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Figure A-7. Author calculations from OECD-Census.
Figure A-8. New employer firms, 1990–2008. An employer firm is distinguished from a non-employer firm on the basis of 
employing people other than the founder. Source: Small Business Administration, The Small Business Economy 2009, at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_econ2009.pdf. 
Figure A-7. Frequency Distribution of Standard Deviations, Firm Births
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Figure A-9. Quarterly Establishment Births, 1993 Q2 to 2009 Q1. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Business Employment 
Dynamics: Fourth Quarter 2008,” August 19, 2009, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cewbd.pdf; Akbar Sadeghi, 
The Births and Deaths of Business Establishments in the United States, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, December 2008, at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2008/12/contents.htm. 
Figure A-10. Author calculations; see sources cited in Figure A-9.
Figure A-9. Frequency Distribution: 
Quarterly Number of New Establishments
Figure A-10. Frequency Distribution of Annual Standard Deviations 
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Figure A-11. Annual number of standard deviations from mean. Authors’ calculations from BDS.
Figure A-12. Annual standards deviations from mean. Authors’ calculations from BDS.
Figure A-11. Annual Deviations from the Mean
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Figure A-13. 1993 Q2 to 2009 Q1. Authors’ calculations from BLS and Sadeghi.

































Figure A-14. Source: BDS.
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Figure A-16. Source: BDS.
Figure A-16. Business Bankruptcies
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Figure A-15. Source: BDS.
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Figure A-18. Source: BDS.










Figure A-17. Source: BDS.
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Figure A-19. Number of New Companies Started in Brazil, 2000–2007. Source: World Bank, at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTFINRES/0,,contentMDK:2145
4009~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:478060,00.html.
Figure A-20. Number of New Companies Started in Ireland, 2000–2007. Source: World Bank, at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTFINRES/0,,contentMDK:21454
009~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:478060,00.html. 
Figure A-19. Brazil: Annual Number of New Companies
Figure A-20. Ireland Annual Number of New Companies
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Figure A-21. Number of New Companies Started in Italy, 2000–2007. Source: World Bank, at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTFINRES/0,,contentMDK:2145
4009~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:478060,00.html.
Figure A-22. Source: BDS.
Figure A-21. Italy: Annual Number of New Companies
Figure A-22. New Firm Formation, 1977–2005
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Figure A-23. Source: BDS.
Figure A-24. Source: BDS.
Figure A-23. Construction: New Firm Formation 1977–2005
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Figure A-25. Source: BDS.















































Figure A-26. Deaths of employer firms, 1990–2008. Source: SBA.
Figure A-26. Employer Firm Deaths, 1990–2008
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Figure A-28. Author calculations from OECD-Census.
Figure A-28. Frequency Distribution of Deviations from Mean: 
Firm Deaths
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Figure A-30. Source: BLS; PricewaterhouseCoopers.








Figure A-29. Source: BLS.
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